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Bio-ontologies are digital frameworks for handling biological and biomedical data. They consist
of theoretical entities and relations with explicitly defined logical structures and precise
definitions, whose purpose is to provide a shared language for representing information to be
distributed and integrated across diverse scientific contexts. It is tempting to view bio-ontologies
as clear and formal expressions of a scientific community’s ontological commitments about their
domain of inquiry, and to view their integration as tantamount to the metaphysical unification of
science that some philosophers have envisaged. However, I argue that the local, practical, social
and technological factors that influence their design prevent us from straightforwardly reading
metaphysical conclusions from them. I discuss these complications and suggest how they can be
overcome, revealing more general lessons for the development of a well-founded scientific
metaphysics.
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1. Introduction
Scientific metaphysics denotes a loose collection of projects which, in one way or another, aim to
bring metaphysics in contact with our best or most successful science (Kincaid, 2013)1. It arose
as a reaction to more traditional a priori approaches to metaphysics which, according to their
critics, rely too much on armchair methods like appeals to intuition that do not reliably produce
true conclusions about reality (Ladyman & Ross, 2007; Bryant, 2020; though see Bennett, 2016).
Scientific metaphysics (sometimes called naturalistic metaphysics) holds that metaphysics can
gain wider intellectual credibility by drawing in principled ways on the sciences themselvesー
whether on the content of science, its methodology, or both. A basic motivating principle behind
scientific metaphysics is that since science investigates reality, and does so with considerable
success, studying its success-making features should have implications about what that reality is
like in metaphysical terms.
However, there are different views about exactly what the relationship between science
and scientific metaphysics is or should be (Chakravartty, 2013). Traditionally, metaphysics has
often been taken to be a subject wholly separate from or prior to empirical inquiry. For example,
some take metaphysics to be about the basic categories of reality, whereas science only deals
with instantiations of those categories (Paul, 2012). Others have argued that metaphysics is prior
to science in the sense that it establishes the a priori conceptual framework that is necessary for
science to proceed in the first place (Lowe, 2002). Yet the existence of a priori elements in
science doesn’t imply that those elements cannot themselves change in response to science as it
evolves (Friedman, 2001). In any case, the very possibility of a metaphysics informed by the
sciences requires that our reasoning about reality can flow from science to metaphysics, not (or
not only) in the other direction. Yet without an explicit and principled account of what sort of
facts from science might be brought to bear on metaphysical questions, and exactly how and why
they are relevant, the very coherence of a scientific metaphysics is on uncertain ground.
To gain traction on these questions, I will consider the implications for scientific
metaphysics of a particular and important aspect of contemporary biological science; namely, its
increasing reliance on the production and reuse of large quantities of data. These major changes
in how science is done have prompted reflection among philosophers and scientists about the
promises and challenges they reveal (Searls, 2005; Brigandt, 2013; Leonelli, 2016; Laubichler et
al., 2018). The majority of philosophical work has approached this largely from a combination of
historical, epistemological and sociological perspectives: Researchers have asked how this new
state of affairs has arisen from earlier stages, whether and how data-driven research changes the
very nature of scientific knowledge, how social and institutional structures make data-driven
knowledge production possible, and so on. In contrast, my focus here is on what the methods and
successes of data-driven biology say about scientific metaphysics.
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The aspect of data-centric biology I will consider is bio-ontologies, which are formal
classification systems used by the biological and biomedical sciences to encode, interpret, store,
share, discover and integrate the growing volumes of data they produce. (They are a special case
of the more general category of ontologies in information science, which covers any
computer-based classification system for some domain, scientific or otherwise.) Bio-ontologies
occupy a background role in modern science, and rarely gain wider attention in the way that
discoveries of new explanations and phenomena do. They might therefore be easily overlooked
by philosophers looking to draw on cutting-edge science for metaphysical discussions, yet they
are key to contemporary data-centric science and its success.
The goal of the present work is to argue that, for scientific metaphysicians interested in
mining contemporary science for insights about metaphysics, bio-ontologies constitute a rich and
untapped well of resources. Of course, philosophers engaging in scientific metaphysics (by that
name or another) have long been interested in analyzing scientific theories in order to identify
their metaphysical aspects or commitments. However, bio-ontologies possess features that make
them particularly amenable to this sort of analysis, yet this promise has until now gone largely
unrealized. My aim here is therefore metaphilosophical: I will not be appealing to bio-ontologies
to argue for a particular metaphysical claim or theory. Rather, I argue that, from the perspective
of scientific metaphysics, at least some metaphysical disputes can be usefully addressed by
looking at bio-ontologies and the wider scientific context surrounding them, and discuss
important factors to consider when doing so.
The reasons for the particular value of bio-ontologies to scientific metaphysics, which I
will elaborate throughout, are as follows. First, bio-ontologies offer a particularly explicit and
formal expression of a scientific community’s current state of biological knowledge. They aim to
capture the way scientists currently conceptualize their domain of inquiry in the form of a set of
terms and relations with clear logical relationships and careful and precise definitions. This is a
result of the demand for data to be handled in computational form in ways that support
automation of various uses of that data, as well as the need to incorporate the needs and insights
of diverse communities of researchers. Second, a primary function of bio-ontologies is to
integrate and synthesise the knowledge of these diverse communities of scientists, with differing
methods, domains of inquiry, terms, definitions, research aims, and so on. They are therefore the
result of careful and ongoing negotiation between parties about the best way to represent
biological knowledge across these differences. Because of this integrative role, bio-ontologies
may be particularly relevant to questions about the metaphysical unity of science, since their aim
is to unify different scientific disciplines and fields under an agreed conceptualization of the
biological world. Third, and finally, these discussions explicitly incorporate conceptual tools
developed in analytic metaphysics. That they bear the name “ontology” is no accident: While
this derives more directly from computer science, it ultimately has origins in the philosophical
sense of the term (Leonelli, 2010)ーthat is, in the branch of metaphysics concerned with the
general categories that constitute reality and how those categories are related. (To distinguish the
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two for the purpose of this paper, I will use the capitalized Ontology to refer to the branch of
philosophy, and lowercase ontology or bio-ontology to refer to the artifacts used in biological
science.) For reasons that will become clear, it is no coincidence that the ongoing design and
administration of bio-ontologies has been strongly influenced by the input of metaphysicians and
the careful clarifications developed in the discipline.
Taken together, these three reasons offer a strong prima facie case for considering
bio-ontologies to be of interest to scientific metaphysics. They suggest that bio-ontologies are, in
effect, products of the fruitful interaction between the careful conceptualisations of metaphysics
on one hand, and empirical science and its concrete practical aims on the other. Le Bihan and
Barton (2018) go as far as suggesting that to develop a bio-ontology is to build a philosophical
Ontology of that domain:
“As a matter of fact, developing rigorous and exhaustive applied ontologies raises
issues very similar to those that are classically raised by philosophical ontology, and it
has become clear that the success of the former will depend on building upon the
theories and methods of the latter. In many respects, building a coherent and solid
applied ontology of biomedicine amounts to building a formalized, philosophical
ontology of biomedicine.” (Le Bihan & Barton, 2018, p4, emphasis in the original)
Critically, the fact that bio-ontologies are explicitly designed for practicing scientists with
concrete empirical goals gives them the all-important connection to empirical success that so
interests scientific metaphysicians. If this is true, it is hard to imagine a more ideal scientific
source than bio-ontologies to inform questions about Ontology in philosophy, at least on the face
of it: If bio-ontologies are literally the Ontological theories chosen by science, one might think
that philosophers aiming to draw metaphysical insights from science can do no better than to
look at the bio-ontologies scientists use. For metaphysicians interested in the Ontological
structure of the biological worldーwhat sorts of things there are and how they relate to each other
ーthere may be little more to do than to look to the entities and relationships in terms of which
biological scientists see fit to encode their empirical data.
The present work critically analyzes this proposal. That is, it considers whether, and in
what respects, biological ontologies might be used to inform Ontological questions in scientific
metaphysics. As I will elaborate, there are reasons to think that the relationship between
bio-ontologies and metaphysics is neither simple nor clear. These complications relate in various
ways to the fact that, rather than being attempts to describe the ultimate or universal structure of
realityーthe purview of Ontology in the classical philosophical senseーbio-ontologies are in the
first instance artifacts designed to achieve concrete epistemic aims in relatively local contexts. So
if bio-ontologies are to be considered relevant to metaphysics at all, there is work to be done to
clarify exactly how their metaphysical significance fits with the epistemic, social, practical, and
technological factors that drive their design.
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I will argue that, rather than being fatal to the prospect of analyzing bio-ontologies for
metaphysical purposes, these complicating factors are simply things to take into account when
we analyze bio-ontologies from a metaphysical perspective. This discussion yields lessons, I
argue, for the broader question of what scientific metaphysics is or might be. Since the raison
d’être of scientific metaphysics is the principle that science’s empirical success underwrites its
relevance to metaphysical questions, this implies that this metaphysical relevance is in some way
intricately woven with the practical and epistemic aspects that make science successful. An
essential task of scientific metaphysics, then, is to understand this complex relationship.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the form and function of
bio-ontologies and how they are designed and administered. Section 3 discusses the prima facie
reasons why bio-ontologies might appear extremely valuable for informing discussions in
scientific metaphysicsーperhaps even that they simply are metaphysical theoriesーand highlights
complicating factors that appear to threaten this promise. Section 4 then proposes ways to
address these complications that point to a particular understanding of scientific metaphysics in
general: Rather than ignoring or bracketing those practical and epistemic motivations,
metaphysicians should instead carefully consider the relationship between those factors, the
design features that result from them, and, crucially, the domain of inquiry the bio-ontologies are
designed to represent. Section 5 then connects these conclusions to broader questions about the
nature and purpose of scientific metaphysics in general. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Form and Function of Bio-ontologies
In the biological and biomedical sciences, high-throughput experimental technologies can
produce massive quantities of data about biological phenomena. As a result, data are increasingly
being reused for research purposes other than those for which they were produced, and even
produced with no particular research question in mind. Data in modern science are therefore a
tangible and reusable scientific commodity (Leonelli, 2015). Multiple datasets from different
sources and in different forms can be integrated to produce new insights about complex systems;
for example, to identify candidate targets for drug interventions (Searls, 2005, Berg, 2014) or to
generate new insights about network structures (Bechtel 2020). To make all of this possible, data
must take a form that can be encoded and labelled digitally, making it possible to store,
distribute, process and integrate them quickly, efficiently, and in high volume. Importantly,
beyond mere storage and distribution, the sheer volume of data has led much of its useーto draw
inferences and make decisionsーto be outsourced from humans to computers. To reduce (but not
eliminate) the risk of cascading errors in these automated operations, the meaning of the terms
and relations being used must be made explicit and precise, so that they can be faithfully adhered
to in the computational rules.
Bio-ontologies are a key factor in achieving these aims. Intrinsically, they consist of a set
of terms and relations corresponding to the entities and empirical relationships that biological
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data are taken to tell us about. They are, in short, formal classification systems (Leonelli, 2016)
ーthey aim to represent the theoretical categories used by a community of scientists in a way that
allows data to be labelled, stored, shared, processed, and integrated by computer. Scientific
investigation has always involved interpreting empirical observations in terms of a set of
categories, sorting those observations into boxes with other instances that share certain things in
common. Lorraine Daston (2004) calls the classification systems used in science “applied
metaphysics”. Modern bioinformatics has simply formalized this perennial feature of empirical
inquiry to implement it in modern digital infrastructures.
According to Leonelli, the classification systems that a research community uses are
designed in accordance with, and are thus evidence of, the theoretical picture under which that
community is operating:
“Researchers who use bio-ontologies for data retrieval implicitly accept, even if they
might not be aware of it, the definition of biological entities and processes contained
within bio-ontologies at the moment at which they are consulted, which in turn affects
how data are used in subsequent research. It is because of this crucial role in expressing
available knowledge of biological phenomena, and thus guiding and structuring
subsequent research, that bio-ontologies are best regarded as a form of theory.” (Leonelli,
2016, p. 125)
According to Leonelli (2016), bio-ontologies as theories have a particular scientific purpose:
namely, they are attempts to coordinate or synthesise the theoretical backgrounds of communities
of researchers. A major source of the value of bio-ontologies lies in their ability to connect the
terms in one domain of investigation to terms in another, such as those of different scientific
disciplines or of communities focused on different model organisms, thus providing a common
language to facilitate interdisciplinary collaboration. The theoretical framework of an individual
research community is adapted to its own particular experimental methods, objects of study,
research aims, and so on. Bio-ontologies often aim to coordinate between individual
communities, and so they aim for terms and relations that are neutral between the specific
contexts of the communities involved.
A widely-used system of bio-ontologies are those of the Open Biological and Biomedical
Ontology (OBO), governed by the OBO Foundry (Smith et al., 2007). The stated aim of the
OBO Foundry is “to develop a family of interoperable ontologies that are both logically
well-formed and scientifically accurate” (http://obofoundry.org) ー in other words, it aims to
develop a growing and evolving family of ontologies that are both comprehensive of their
individual domains and well-connected to others in the family. Coordination and integration
efforts are thus applied both within bio-ontologiesーbetween members of the community that
uses a given ontologyーand between ontologies used by different communities.
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One OBO ontology, from which I will draw my examples, is the Gene Ontology (GO).
The GO aims to be an authoritative and general-purpose repository for information about the
functions of genes (and gene products, also called “genes” as a shorthand) across different
biological taxa. Like all OBO ontologies, the GO is essentially a graph-theoretic object
consisting of terms (nodes) and relations between those terms. As we’ll see, these terms and
relations are governed by strict rules that determine the logical and inferential implications of the
information being represented.
The GO consists of three sub-ontologiesーmolecular functions, cellular components, and
biological processes. For example, mitochondrion is a cellular component (Fig. 1). Together,
these three sub-ontologies aim to provide the basis for representing scientific knowledge of the
functions of genes across different biological taxa: what the gene products interact with, what
processes they are involved in, which part of which organisms those processes occur in, and so
on. As an OBO ontology, the GO is subject to the OBO’s strict rules for inclusion. For example,
all OBO ontologies must be connected (via relations between terms) to the basic formal ontology
(BFO) that provides the foundations on which the terms of the other ontologies are built.
This formalized model of biological processes, their relations and components is
structured by the relations between the terms. Some of these are generic relations applicable
outside biology, such as is_a and part_of, while others are more domain-specific, such as
negatively_regulates. Each of these has its own set of properties, such as transitivity, and rules
for their application. For example, the relation is_a (“is a subclass of”) must only occur within
the sub-ontologies; a biological process cannot be a subclass of a cellular component. The
sub-ontologies are connected to each other by other relations; a biological process can bear the
occurs_in relation to a cellular component, for instance. GO terms are also connected to terms in
other BFO ontologies, such as ChEBI (Chemical Entities of Biological Interest) which deals with
small chemical compounds.
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Fig. 1: Ancestor chart for mitochondrion in the Gene Ontology. That the mitochondrion is a cellular
component is shown by its connection to the root term cellular component by a chain of is_a relations. It
also bears the relation part_of to other cellular components, as well as other types of relation to other terms
(not shown).
This logical structure allows the GO to serve its purpose of representing empirical
information about gene function. This information takes the form of annotations, which express
claims about the functions of genes by connecting gene names to the terms of the GO via its
relations. Each annotation is accompanied by at least one piece of evidence (classified according
to the Evidence and Conclusion Ontology, another member of the OBO ontology family),
whether direct experimental evidence, or indirect kinds such as inference from similarity with
another gene. Many annotations are verified manually by researchers with expertise in both the
relevant biology and in formal knowledge representation, often in response to suggestions
generated by text mining software that parse scientific literature to extract its empirical claims.
Natural language processing tools can more generally be used to interpret scientific texts by
connecting its contents to the terms of an ontology (Hirschman et al., 2012; Hoehndorf et al.,
2015).
Importantly, many GO annotations are inferred automatically based on the ontology’s
logical structure. For example, if gene G is annotated as involved in process P, and process P is a
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part of process Q, then gene G is inferred to be involved in process Q. The logical axioms that
constitute the ontology can therefore be put to service in automated reasoningーto detect
contradictions or answer complex queries (Hoehndorf et al., 2015). Ultimately, however, all
evidence derives, more or less directly, from explicitly cited sources in the scientific literature.
Annotations can be added, removed, and changed in light of new empirical evidence and
requests from researchers. The GO thus aims to constitute a “snapshot” of current biological
knowledge by being responsive in this way to scientific developments.
Aside from updating annotations that connect genes to the ontology, another way in
which the GO responds to scientific feedback is by updating the terms and relations that
constitute the ontologyーthe molecular functions, biological processes and cellular components
it includes, how they are defined, and the relations between them. Updates to the ontology are
performed in response to user requests and through collaboration with specialist curators. For
example, as Leonelli et al. (2011) describe, the term “serotonin secretion” was revised when it
was noticed that it erroneously implied (via is_a relations) that “serotonin secretion during acute
inflammatory response” was an instance of “neurotransmitter secretion”. In acute inflammatory
response serotonin’s targets are not neurons, so a new tree structure was generated to reflect this.
In general, the evolution of the GO and other bio-ontologies involves careful discussion of the
definitions and logical relationships between its terms (Leonelli et al. 2011; Leonelli 2010). As
well as cultivating internally coherent and scientifically sound logical structure, good design and
curation of bio-ontologies also requires understanding the relationship between its terms and the
different theories, purposes, and experimental methods of the scientific disciplines involved
(Leonelli, 2010; Smith & Ceusters 2010; Sterner et al., 2020b). In the interest of collaboration
and integration, it must also be able to expand to incorporate new organisms, new types of
biological phenomenon, and so on.
Scientific understanding is of course ever-changing and expanding, and changing
relationships between disciplines and fields requires constant revision of the scope and diversity
of a bio-ontology’s structure and content. The continuing authority and trust afforded to the GO
hinges critically on the mechanisms by which it responds to these changes (Leonelli, 2010;
Leonelli et al. 2011).
3. Promises and Problems for Scientific Metaphysics
The previous section provided a brief sketch of the form and function of bio-ontologies: what
they consist of, what purposes they serve, and how they are administered. It is due to these
features of bio-ontologies that they may be a very promising avenue of research for scientific
metaphysicians that has gone largely unexplored. (Not without exception; for example, Bechtel
(2017) draws attention to bio-ontologies to lend scientific clarity to the longstanding problem of
emergence.) Here I elaborate on the reasons for optimism about this project, which I prefaced in
Section 1. However, each of these reasons comes with potential problems that complicate, and
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may even undermine, the relationship between bio-ontologies and scientific metaphysics as a
philosophical pursuit. I address each of these in turn.
The first promising feature is that, in aiming to capture biological knowledge in formal
and explicit terms, the structure of bio-ontologies resembles Ontological theories in the
philosophical sense. That is, they import concepts and principles developed in philosophical
contexts to give explicit logical rigour to working scientific theories. It turns out that the kind of
clarification of concepts in which metaphysicians have been engaged for some time is very
important when outsourcing our reasoning to machines (Le Bihan & Barton, 2015): To avoid
compounding errors in automated reasoning, one has to carefully work out inferential rules
associated with those concepts and encode those rules into the system. For example, in the case
of continuants (as opposed to occurrents, or processes) in OBO ontologies, the is_a relation must
specify a time at which that relation obtains. Otherwise, this leads to errors: Every instance of
adult was at one time an instance of child; it doesn’t follow that adult is_a child (Smith et al.
2005).
What’s more, the fact that bio-ontologies evolve in response to the changing state of
scientific knowledge and the feedback of scientists who use them endows those ontologies with
the empirical validity that scientific metaphysicians demand. At first glance, then, if one is
interested in the Ontological structure of a particular biological domain, one could do no better
than to look at the bio-ontologies that scientists investigating that domain choose to structure and
manage their data, since they lay bare those Ontological commitments in full and explicit detail.
For example, if one wishes to analyze a scientific theory from a structural realist perspective, a
way to identify the theory’s structure would be to look at the relational structure of the associated
ontology or ontologiesーthat is, what relations are used to express knowledge of its domain, the
logical rules associated with those relations, and so on. A scientific metaphysician interested in
composition and part-whole relationships in biology, for example, might simply look at how the
relation “is a part of” is used in the handling of scientific data in that context, what things are
taken to stand in these relations with each other, the evidence demanded for claims about these
part-whole relationships, and so on (Smith et al. 2005; Leonelli et al. 2011).
Second, the fact that bio-ontologies are deliberately designed for purposes of data
integration makes them potentially highly relevant to metaphysical questions about pluralism and
the unity of science. A common view in philosophy of science has been that science aims to
establish a single, unified picture of the worldーby the abandonment of inadequate theories, the
reduction of higher-level or more specific theories to lower-level or more general ones, and so on
(Oppenheim & Putnam, 1958). However, claims about the unity of science as a goal must deal
with the fact of scientific pluralismーthat equally respectable sciences can operate with very
different, even apparently contradictory, theoretical pictures. Some take this diversity to be
explained, even “fully justified” (Leonelli, 2010, p. 110), by the fact that a discipline’s theory
forms a complement with its own experimental methods, tacit knowledge, purposes, objects of
study, and so on. In short, scientific pluralism as a philosophy generally interprets theoretical
11
diversity among the sciences as each adapting to its own practical context, and hence rejects the
claim that science aims, or should aim, to unify under a single overarching theory. Rather than a
sign of immaturity, the fact of plurality is a natural consequence of scientific progress in
investigating a complex world (Dupré, 1993; Mitchell, 2003; Kellert et al., 2006; Waters, 2016).
An understanding of bio-ontologies and their interoperability may offer a new perspective
on this issue. The increasing emphasis on integration of data from diverse origins challenges at
least some versions of pluralismーthose that claim that there is no scientific motivation to unify
the diverse ontological pictures that scientists use. To participate in the wider community of
data-centric science, it is no longer feasible for a particular community to simply hold to its own
conceptual framework for its own idiosyncratic context without any consideration for how those
concepts relate to those of other communities. As Laubichler et al. (2018) claim, the goal of
integrating data produced in different disciplinary contexts requires us to consider clearly how
their theoretical posits relate to each otherーthat is, to develop “a theory of theory integration”.
Arguably, by abstracting from the idiosyncrasies of individual perspectives, the resulting
integrated theory would be more objective (or at least intersubjective), since it would
accommodate a wider range of scientific viewpoints. Importantly, this argument against strong
pluralism is not just motivated by a priori intuitions about a unified reality, but by the concrete
needs of science in practice. While this fact about bio-ontologies may not be taken to entail
either a pluralist or monist metaphysical outlook (recall that I do not make any particular
metaphysical claim here), it might at least put pressure on the hard-line pluralist by providing
empirical observations about science that they must account for. In short, the process of
integrating bio-ontologies forces us to engage with the idea that for all their differences, different
scientific models, theories, and disciplines are in some sense dealing with the same thing (in the
broadest possible sense of “thing”)2.
Thirdly, and finally, another reason why bio-ontologies might be taken to be relevant to
metaphysics is that prominent researchers consider the metaphysical interpretation of
bio-ontologies to be critically important to their design. For them, the importance of metaphysics
to bio-ontology design is not just about the clarification of concepts and their associated
inferential rules. Instead, they see effective data management in science as depending critically
on the adoption of a certain kind of metaphysical outlook. The OBO Foundry was co-founded by
a metaphysician, Barry Smith, following a series of influential critiques of existing data systems
used in biomedicine (e.g. Smith & Ceusters 2006) that led to the introduction of strict standards
to govern those systems and their evolution. According to Smith (and othersーsee Munn &
Smith 2013), the root cause of the design flaws in those earlier systems was precisely the
designers’ rejection of the notion that data represent a reality independent of us and our concepts.
To avoid those problems, they argue, one must be motivated by a particular kind of Realist
outlook; namely, that the general kind terms of bio-ontologies refer not to mind-dependent
concepts but to Aristotelian universals (see e.g. Smith, 2004). This discussion is likely to pique
the interest of the scientific metaphysician: from their perspective, it would be a strong argument
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in favour of some metaphysical theory if the adoption of that theory has been instrumental to
scientific success.
Taken together, these three observations give us reason to see bio-ontologies as valuable
sources of evidence in discussions about metaphysics. In general, they paint a picture in which
bio-ontologies are, effectively, the empirical application of metaphysical ideas, and hence their
uptake by scientists driven by empirical success counts as support for their metaphysical
features. More strongly, these observations might even establish that bio-ontologies simply are
metaphysical theories, or are at least underwritten in important ways by metaphysical
commitments. If so, these theories gain critical naturalistic credibility from their demonstrable
benefits to actual empirical work.
However, things are not so simple: each of the reasons above belie complications to the
relationship between bio-ontologies and metaphysical Ontology. Each of these have to do with
the practical, technological, social and epistemic factors that affect bio-ontology design in
important ways.
Consider the first observation aboveーthat bio-ontologies are clear formal
conceptualizations of biological theories. The complication here is this: it’s not clear that
bio-ontology design is straightforwardly an exercise in expressing the consensus Ontology of the
science, since the primary purpose for their design are the practical needs of efficient storage,
sharing, integration, and so on. These practical needs may (and should, given those purposes)
manifest in the design of the ontologies. For example, the fact that bio-ontologies must identify
clear boundaries for their terms and strict rules for relations may simply follow from the nature
of computational representation and the demand for reliable automated processing of large
volumes of data. But the domains of biological and biomedical science may not neatly reflect the
precise structures and rigorous characterizations that are to be found in the computational
processes; in fact, the difficulties inherent in bio-ontology curation may be due to the fact that the
world simply isn’t fully understandable in terms of essential definitions, part-whole
relationships, and so on (Dupré, 1993; Ladyman & Ross 2007). To put it one way, it may be that
the behaviour of the biological worldーbeing fuzzy, contingent, contextual, and exception-ridden
ーis more akin to natural language than to computational language; it’s just that we can only use
the latter in silico. In short, those features of bio-ontologies that make them potentially tractable
to metaphysical analysisーtheir explicit formal structure and strict rulesーmay simply be an
artifact of the technological role of bio-ontologies rather than a direct reflection of the
Ontological structure of the domains they represent. Hence, we cannot straightforwardly
conclude that the empirical domain of the science in question has some features from the fact
that they are represented as having those features in bio-ontologies.
Second, consider the integrative role of bio-ontologies, which appear to make them
pertinent to metaphysical questions about unification and reduction. The complication here is
that the push towards unification and interoperability in bio-ontologies has a counteracting force;
namely, the need to account for the diversity and dissensus that exists between the participating
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communities. It is partly for this reason that not all scientific communities buy into calls for
unification, and the associated formal strictures, of projects such as the OBO. Leonelli (2010)
describes a looming threat of the perception of “terminological imperialism” in bio-ontologies:
In order to maintain the trust of the users and the authority granted to the information the
bio-ontologies provide, bio-ontologies must be responsive (and be seen to be responsive) to the
individual needs of the participating communities rather than imposing standards that are alien to
their particular practices and assumptions. It is partly this need that has given rise to the distinct
profession of bio-ontology curators, whose job is to mediate between the requirements of the
classification system and the individual scientific contexts that both produce and use the data.
What’s more, it has been argued that unification in classification systems is not always necessary
to facilitate integration efforts. As argued by Sterner et al. (2020a, b), integration doesn’t
necessarily require forcing a consensus about classification where none exists; there are ways to
pool data for integration purposes while allowing them to retain the idiosyncrasies of their
origins, and to coordinate data representation in ways that honour dissensus in the definitions of
terms.
These things complicate the relationship between integration in bio-ontologies and
theoretical unification, since the claim that unification indicates metaphysical unity across
domains is weakened if important domain-specific features are lost in the process. So in
considering the Ontological implications of bio-ontologies, we need to consider not just what
their interoperability enables but what it prohibits: as well as emphasising similarity, it may at the
same time gloss over relevant differences in the actual phenomena3.
Finally, consider the third argument aboveーthat many consider the metaphysical
interpretation of bio-ontologies to be of demonstrable scientific importance. The complication
here is that researchers involved in ontology design themselves disagree on the metaphysical
commitments underlying design decisions. This is made clear by an exchange between Merrill
(2010a,b) and Smith and Ceusters (2010) in the journal Applied Ontology. A central theme of
that exchange is whether the design and administration of biological and biomedical ontologies
is or should be based on a Realist methodology, or indeed on any metaphysical principles beyond
the technical demands of logic, formal semantics, and philosophy of language. Merrill argues
that the criticisms of and subsequent improvements to bio-ontologies attributable to Smith and
Ceusters, while important, are also justifiable on non-realist grounds such as under a nominalist
interpretation of kind terms. Further evidence of disagreement about the metaphysical
underpinnings of ontology design is evident in discussions on the OBO message board4. The
details of this exchange are too numerous and intricate to discuss here. The key point for present
purposes is simply that practitioners disagree about whether and how we must interpret
bio-ontologies in metaphysical terms to properly motivate and direct their design and
administration. This challenges the idea that those metaphysical commitments are as essential to
the concrete practical aspects of bio-ontology as some make them out to be, and may call into
question whether there is any substantial metaphysical import to bio-ontologies at all.
14
These complications lead us to conclude that, at the very least, tying metaphysical
discourse to the tangible features of scientific practice is a double-edged sword: While the
concrete practical functions of scientific artifacts and practices such as those surrounding
bio-ontologies are the source of their promise for scientific metaphysics, they are also the very
thing complicating the goal of drawing metaphysical conclusions from them. This raises more
general foundational questions affecting the prospects of scientific metaphysics: How can we
defer to the epistemic and other features of scienceーthose from which science draws its success
ーwhile retaining the metaphysical (and not simply practical or epistemological) import of the
conclusions we reach; and, for that matter, without presuming to go “around” or “beyond”
science in ways that are suspect from a naturalistic perspective? In the next section, I will point
towards ways to tackle these questions in relation to bio-ontologies.
4. A Way Forward
How are we to understand the nature and extent of the connection between bio-ontologies as
scientific artifacts and Ontology as a philosophical pursuit? Answers to this question will lie
somewhere between two extremes. One extreme position may be that that scientific ontology
design just is Ontology in the philosophical senseーperhaps the only Ontology worth doingーand
that bio-ontologies are literally metaphysical theses about how the world hangs together. At the
other extreme, it might be argued that the structure of bio-ontologies has nothing at all to do with
the questions that concern metaphysiciansーthat despite the formal similarity, applied ontology
as it relates to scientific data is entirely distinct from and irrelevant to Ontology in the
philosophical sense. When we consider the complications created by the local, practical,
epistemic, social and technological factors that affect how bio-ontologies are structured, we call
the first extreme position into question, but potentially risk slipping into the second. The
challenge, then, is to find a reasonable position between these two extremes. In this section, I
suggest a way forward by proposing how to approach the metaphysical interpretation of
bio-ontologies with the above three issues in mind.
Following the same order as above, consider first the point that bio-ontologies formally
resemble Ontological theories (or frameworks for making Ontological claims). The complication
I raised is that the design of bio-ontologies is adapted to their function as digital repositories of
data and to structure automated reasoning, and so certain design features may simply be a result
of those technical requirements rather than reflections of how the world being described is
structured. At the very least, the existence of other explanations for certain structures in
bio-ontologies, such as the need for reliable automated inferences, weakens the case for
straightforward Ontological interpretations of those features. However, rather than being fatal to
the idea of drawing metaphysical lessons from bio-ontologies, we can instead take the influence
of these contextual practical factors as something we must consider before we jump to
metaphysical conclusions. To be sure, bio-ontologies are in the first instance technical artifacts
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designed by and for scientific communities with particular goals. However, it is critical to
remember that many of those goals relate in important ways to successful investigation of the
biological world, and so depend for their success on what the biological world is like. So while
their design and successful application is certainly influenced by practical, social, technological,
and other factors, they are presumably also affected in some way by the domain of inquiry as it is
encountered in the process of scientific investigation. A task for scientific metaphysicians, then,
is to tease out general principles (if indeed there are any to be found) about how these various
influences, including the domain of inquiry, interact in the development of bio-ontological
structures. Only then can they properly understand the relationship between those structures and
the biological world they represent.
Similar lessons apply to the second issueーof data integration and its implications (or
lack thereof) for questions about the unity of science. As I observed above, many consider the
demands imposed by integration and interoperability to be in tension with the context-specific
needs of individual communities. However, while there are situations in which features of
bio-ontologies do not reflect a consensus (but rather a compromise, or perhaps even an executive
decision that is not endorsed by all parties), we can take cases where there is consensus about
ontologies and their interrelationships as being potentially metaphysically significant, even to a
non-pluralist. Consensus is a matter of degree; the stronger the consensus, and more diverse the
communities among which that consensus is reached, the more confident we can be that it is a
matter of cross-contextual agreement about the world. What’s more, disagreement isn’t
necessarily a sign of immature science on the way to becoming more settled and universalized;
instead it may be that differences in the communities’ respective domains demand that they be
represented differently in data. Plurality, like unification, is potentially metaphysically
significant, since pluralism is (for some) a metaphysical thesis.
This point might be understood as an argument about robustness in the sense of Wimsatt
(2007): Biological phenomena are varyingly stable over time, across contexts, under different
perspectives, and so on. When they are stable, and to the extent that they are, science will tend to
track them with terms that are similarly robustーthat is, more amenable to consensus between
scientific contexts or perspectives. With that in mind, we can potentially interpret high degrees of
consensus in bio-ontologies as evidence of relatively high robustness in the phenomena in
question. In other words, consensus can be seen as a kind of triangulation of robust patterns in
the biological world. (This evidence is defeasible, however, since categories may be stable not
because they capture a robust feature of the world but because they are developmentally
entrenched5.) More generally, this kind of reasoning points the way to a critical point of contact
between metaphysics and epistemology that scientific metaphysicians require. That is, when we
understand epistemic features (such as consensus) as functionally coupled to certain features of
the world (such as robustness), this permits inferences between the two.
Finally, consider the issue of disagreements about the metaphysical interpretation of
bio-ontology, as represented in the exchange between Smith and Ceusters and Merrill, for
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example. I will not attempt to settle this dispute here. Instead, the critical point for the present
discussion is this: For all their differences, participants in this debate seem to agree that it is only
important to the extent that it has implications for scientific methodology. That is, philosophical
discussions about things like universals are important to science when, and only when, they
make a difference to how scientific institutions design, administer, regulate and improve
scientific ontologies, and when those differences affect the success of the scientific enterprise.
Smith and Ceusters, for example, claim that understanding terms as corresponding to things in
reality places a critical constraint on what terms are admissible, which is necessary to facilitate
integration. If there were another, non-realist way to motivate the same constraint, as Merrill
claims, the discussion has at that point passed beyond the horizon of empirical relevance, and
into what Amanda Bryant (2020) calls “free range metaphysics”. On the other hand, if those
constraints on the admissibility of terms are shown to be too strict for concrete practical purposes
ーfor instance, if they lead ontologists to disallow terms such as “non-smoker” or “absent arm”
that are used by practitioners6ーthen one must either relinquish those realist commitments or, if
one prefers, find a realist-friendly way to interpret those terms in the formal ontology. Either
way, the result is by hypothesis the same: what ultimately matters is what is done, not the “ism”
we attach to what is done.
This point of agreement is important for understanding how formal scientific ontologies
and their integration matter to scientific metaphysics in the present sense. For scientific
metaphysics to be properly empirical (hence earning its scientific epithet), it should be attentive
to the horizon within which metaphysical principles have concrete practical and empirical
implications, and hence can potentially make a difference to success and failure in scientific
practice. For only when they do make a difference to practice, and hence potentially to success,
can they be said to be justifiable on scientific grounds. Precisely where this horizon of practical
relevance lies is evidently undecided even among practitioners. Whether there is any value in
general to super-empirical disputes that lie beyond the horizon of the concrete needs and
purposes of science, this is irrelevant by definition to scientific metaphysics as an
empirically-constrained project. In any case, discussions about the proper way to design and
regulate bio-ontologies are of direct importance to scientific metaphysicians, for they are
effectively discussions about which metaphysical disputes are scientific at all.
5. Discussion: What is Scientific Metaphysics?
As mentioned, the project of scientific metaphysics is founded on the principle that, since science
is so successful at predicting, explaining and manipulating the world, its success-making features
should tell us something about what the world is like. Yet this leaves open exactly how this
project is to be carried outーwhich aspects of science are metaphysically relevant, and how
observations about those aspects are to be translated into metaphysical claims. In this section, I
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draw from the above discussion about the metaphysical interpretation of bio-ontologies to
address broader questions about scientific metaphysics in general.
Scientific metaphysicians are agreed that metaphysics should draw on successful science.
However, when we investigate concrete cases of success-making scientific phenomena, such as
bio-ontologies, drawing metaphysical inferences from those features looks far from
straightforward. As we’ve seen, bio-ontologiesーindeed, working scientific theories in generalー
are embedded in a complex web of practical goals, social interactions, technological needs and
constraints, and trade-offs between all of these. Because of this, we cannot straightforwardly
infer from the fact that a bio-ontology defines its entities and relations in a certain way, for
example, to the conclusion that the domain’s entities and relations really have those features
(with “really” interpreted in some strong metaphysical sense). However, as I argued in the
previous section, this doesn’t mean that scientific metaphysics is a lost cause. What it does mean
is that scientific metaphysics cannot ignore those factors, and must instead closely study how
they contribute to the formation and evolution of science’s ontologiesーboth its formal, digital
ontologies and the relatively informal ones used in journal articles or lab discussions. Only then
can we bring into view what those ontologies say about the world that those sciences are
investigating.
In short, the complexities apparent in cases such as that of bio-ontologies call for a
scientific metaphysics that explicitly studies and incorporates scientific practice. Some
philosophers have taken this approach, more or less implicitly, for some years now. However,
there have recently been focused attempts to galvanize researchers in this line of inquiry
(Wimsatt 2007; Waters 2016; Ereshefsky and Reydon, forthcoming) The present work also aims
to embody this mission. With this in mind, we can address three questionsーthose that any
scientific metaphysics should addressーwith the lessons of the case of bio-ontologies in mind.
The answers I propose all invoke the importance of attention to scientific practice.
There are, as I see it, a number of distinct questions about scientific metaphysics to which
any version of it should provide an answer. First, what is scientific about one’s scientific
metaphysics? That is, in what way does it draw on science to inform or otherwise constrain its
conclusions? Second, what is metaphysical about it? That is, in what sense is it a distinct pursuit
from both science and “mere” epistemology? In distinguishing itself from science and
epistemology, it must not (given the broadly naturalistic motivations of scientific metaphysics)
presume to be going beyond or around science in ways that are problematic from a naturalistic
perspective. Finally, what is the ultimate aim or purpose of this scientific metaphysics? What
intellectual or other kind of goals does it serve? My above discussion of the metaphysical
significance of bio-ontologies yields more general lessons for how we might understand the
nature, methods, and aims of scientific metaphysics, which I discuss here.
Consider the first questionーof what observations about science might inform
metaphysical questions, and why. Bio-ontologies, as I’ve shown, are a strong candidate for a
source of fodder for metaphysical discussion because their design features explicitly incorporate
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concepts developed in metaphysics and other branches of philosophy. While bio-ontologies are
certainly influenced by their practical contexts in a variety of important ways, this does not
preclude their being used by scientific metaphysicians to inform their own philosophical
discussions about Ontology. If we understand metaphysics as the search for the best
conceptualization(s) of the world we live in (whether by “best” we mean the truest, or something
else), then we would do well as scientific metaphysicians to look at how scientists see fit to
conceptualize it. Practical complexities notwithstanding, bio-ontologies do represent varying
degrees of consensus between scientific communities about how to conceptualize their domains
for the purposes of predicting, explaining, and manipulating them. There are, as we have seen,
other factors affecting the structure of bio-ontologies besides simply “what the world is really
like”. Rather than ignoring this, a properly scientific metaphysics should be acutely aware of
those influences in order to control for themーto determine the extent to which the structure of a
bio-ontology says something about the structure of the domain it is used to represent.
On the second questionーof what is metaphysical, and not “merely” scientific or
epistemological about this projectーthe answer can only be a complex and nuanced one. As I
take it, the very possibility of scientific metaphysics implies the rejection of sharp divides
between the epistemological and the metaphysical and between the metaphysical and the
scientific, since it is precisely the epistemic successes of science that are taken to underwrite its
metaphysical significance. A properly scientific metaphysics goes through science, not around it.
Yet this leaves open exactly how scientific metaphysics stands apart from those other pursuits.
In this discussion, we can see a relatively clear picture of where metaphysics enters the
realm of science, and vice versa, while remaining distinct. As I’ve mentioned, a longstanding
view of metaphysics is that it is independent of scientific findings because it is the very
conceptual framework within which empirical observations can be understood. In a way, that is
what bio-ontologies are: they are “prior” to empirical findings in that they provide the very
conceptual structure within which those empirical findings are represented. However, this does
not make bio-ontology design a purely a priori exercise: As science develops, communities of
scientists adjust those frameworks to better suit their evolving empirical needs. In that sense,
then, they are not prior to empirical data but an attempt to accommodate and organize them that
evolves as those data accumulate. In short, the study of bio-ontologies from a metaphysical
perspective may be better suited to a relativized a priori account of the role of metaphysics in
science: In brief, scientific metaphysics is concerned with the conceptual or logical frameworks
within which science structures and organizes its data and, critically, how those frameworks
change in parallel with the scientific enterprises they support. A key challenge for scientific
metaphysics is to understand the mechanisms by which those changes occur.
Aside from questions about the relationship between metaphysics and science, we also
need an account of the relationship between metaphysics and epistemologyーone that establishes
our pursuit as a case for the former. I’ve argued that, in the process of analyzing bio-ontologies
for metaphysical purposes, one must carefully consider the various factors that influence their
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structure, which include the epistemic, practical, social and technological contexts they are
designed for. However, we can suppose that the best way to classify a domain in the form of a
bio-ontology is at least partly determined by what that domain is like, as well as those other
factors. This approach generalizes beyond bio-ontologies: Consider Alan Love’s claim that
typology in developmental biology is not a metaphysical claim but instead “a form of thinking or
reasoning, as conceptual behavior” (Love, 2009, p. 53). This may well be true, but this doesn’t
prevent us from supposing that the value of typological thinking in developmental biology has
something to do with the world: If the workings of biological development had been different, it
might not have been so useful to scientists to think about it typologically. In short, while we
should certainly understand scientific classifications such as those of bio-ontologies in epistemic
termsーas modes of thinkingーwe can also take those modes of thinking to be more or less
well-suited to the investigation of certain types of phenomena. To say that an object “makes a
good hammer”, while essentially tied to intended use, also says something about that object: that
it is heavy, that it isn’t brittle, and so on. In the same way, to say that a biological phenomenon
can be usefully studied with this or that epistemic strategy is to say something about that
phenomenon.
This discussion leads to an important principle underlying the emerging project of
incorporating biological practice into discussions of scientific metaphysics. Typically,
philosophical work that emphasises scientific practice either brackets or actively distances itself
from metaphysical questions, focusing instead on its epistemic, social, technological, and other
features. Yet it is beginning to be realized that while these features are indeed the source of
science’s success, this success is not fully accounted for until we consider the role of the world in
making scientific practices successful (Waters 2016; Ereshefsky and Reydon, forthcoming).
Scientific interactions with the world are functional interactions, and that functionality involves
not just “internal” features of science such as its theories and methods, but also the external
environment with which they interact. This key role for the world in determining the success of
those interactions is what justifies these projects as metaphysical. A metaphysics based on
scientific practice is tasked with understanding those interactions.
To put this another way, we can understand scientific epistemology and scientific
metaphysics as effectively studying the same thingーscientific practiceーbut with different
emphasis. Both are concerned with the nature and extent of scientific consensus about how best
to conceptualize the world in order to successfully interact with it. However, each focuses on
different aspects of what makes one way better than another: While epistemology typically
emphasises the social and epistemic forces affecting the development of biological knowledge,
metaphysics considers the extent to which that development is affected and constrained by the
biological world being investigated. Any attempt to do one without the other, I argue, is
philosophically suspect: we cannot make sense of the idea that we should aim to express what
the world is like rather than what we believe about what the world is like. Claiming to do so
leads us to a pragmatic contradiction (van Fraassen, 2008, Ch. 11).
20
Finally, this brings us to the question of the aims of scientific metaphysics: what
intellectual purpose is served by the project of teasing apart the different influences on epistemic
artifacts in science such as bio-ontologies? Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue that the proper role
of scientific metaphysics is to unify the sciences by relating them all to the posits of fundamental
physics, thus placing unilateral constraints on the admissible claims of the special sciences.
While this is certainly one legitimate role, there is perhaps a more general view we can take.
First, there are ways to illuminate the relationships between scientific disciplines besides relating
them all to fundamental physics; in the OBO, for example, the unifying theory is that of the
Basic Formal Ontology, which provides the conceptual building blocks for the more provincial
ontologies. With that in mind, the role of philosophers and philosophical thinking in that project
is unsurprisingーit can be understood in terms of what some see as the broader aim of
philosophy, which is to provide the connective tissue between other disciplines (Hoffmann,
Schmidt & Nersessian 2013). As we’ve seen, this requires understanding how each discipline’s
theoretical elements are adapted to their particular contexts, methods and aims, so that those
influences can be abstracted in order to establish a shared conceptual basis that all parties can
agree on.
Second, there is value not just in clarifying the connections between scientific disciplines,
but also between science and other spheres of human interest. It’s easy to see how one might be
interested in what science has to say about what are often considered metaphysical mattersー
about individuality, causality, sex, gender, race, parthood, free will, mind and matter, and so onー
for purposes that are not themselves scientific. While science is of course deeply interconnected
with other spheres of human activity and the world at large, we can understand it to have aims
that are in some sense intrinsic to itーaims relating to prediction and control, explanation,
revealing new avenues of investigation, and so on. In fact, this difference in purpose is what
complexifies the relationship between how science treats those matters and how humanity more
generally should think of themーwhy scientific metaphysics is not a straightforward matter of
“reading off” its conclusions from the sciences. As Haslanger (2016) argues, for example, the
standards by which the biological sciences sort human beings into sex categories may not be
well-suited to other human institutions or to our intrapersonal self-understanding, simply because
the aims for their categorizations are different. Nevertheless, these different spheres are in an
important sense overlapping, and so we can consider one task of scientific metaphysics as aiming
to explore and clarify the extent and implications of this overlap. Just like the project of
mediating between scientific disciplines, a necessary part of this wider project will be to
understand how scientific ontologies are affected by the sciences’ particular interests and
purposes, and hence how other spheres of human inquiry might employ ontologies more suited
to their own. This, in short, is precisely the project of scientific metaphysics I have outlined here.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, I outlined some general features of the form and function of bio-ontologies used in
modern data-driven biological and biomedical science. At first glance, they may appear to be
straightforwardly interpreted as Ontological frameworks used by the sciences, and therefore ideal
sources of evidence for scientific metaphysicians interested in arbitrating between metaphysical
claims by appeal to successful science. However, there are some important factors complicating
that interpretation, which all have to do with the fact that bio-ontologies are in the first instance
artifacts designed for concrete practical purposes, some of which weaken the connection between
them and metaphysics as traditionally understood. This is not fatal to the idea that bio-ontologies
can be analyzed in the service of metaphysics, however. In fact, the idea that bio-ontologies are
influenced by their practical and epistemic context makes them quite amenable to analysis from a
scientific metaphysics perspective. Since scientific metaphysics takes epistemic success to be the
source of science’s metaphysical significance, a rigorous scientific metaphysics should simply
aim to understand how successful scientific practices, and their associated artifacts such as
bio-ontologies, are influenced both by their local epistemic contexts and by the domain they are
designed to investigate.
In this work I have explicitly avoided committing to a particular metaphysical theory or
approach in proposing how bio-ontologies might be studied from a scientific metaphysics
perspective. Which theory or approach is best is left to the outcome of future workーwork that I
hope to have convinced the reader is worthwhile. The essential role of attention to scientific
practice is the only firm recommendation that I offer to this ongoing project.
Notes
1 A related field is what is often called metaphysics of science, which (as I understand it) aims to
establish the metaphysical underpinnings of concepts that are employed in scientific theories,
such as causation and law. I take this to be a somewhat different endeavour than scientific
metaphysics, though they may overlap.
2 Brigandt (2010) argues that unification is often localized to particular research aims rather than
reflecting a global move towards the ideal of a unified science. However, the idea that theoretical
unification is both possible and desirable in local contexts may be cause for optimism about the
possibility of a more far-reaching unification project, even if scientists themselves have more
local aims.
3 Of course (as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer), adherents to a thoroughly pluralist
metaphysics are likely to be untroubled by this problem, since they do not see unification as a
goal of science or a requirement for its metaphysical relevance in the first place. This point
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reminds us that disagreements about metaphysics are difficult to separate from disagreements
about what constitutes a metaphysics at all.
4 http://tinyurl.com/34lacvy
5 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
6 For interesting informal discussion on these issues in the OBO discussion group, see
http://tinyurl.com/34lacvy.
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